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NOTE
THE DOCTRINE OF INTERTWINING:
A DEAD-END AFTER
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd1
INTRODUCTION
The arbitrability of pendent state claims in federal securities cases has
become a problematic issue. This issue arises out of federal courts' efforts
to recognize the conflicting policies of two federal statutes in the context of
investor-broker disputes. 2 Since 1953 federal courts have chosen sides in this
controversy3 between the pro-investor Securities Acts' (hereinafter Securities
Act, 1933 Act, or 1934 Act) and the pro-broker Federal Arbitration Act 5
(hereinafter Arbitration Act). Ineffectual attempts to reconcile the two com-
peting policies were exemplified in a recent dispute between a retired dentist
and his investment company, where the issue was settled by the United States
Supreme Court in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.6 The Court held that
district courts have no discretion to direct parties to arbitrate an issue en-
compassed in an arbitration agreement because the Arbitration Act mandates
that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration in those
controversies involving both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims. 7 In so hold-
ing, the Court stamped the resulting bifurcated proceedings with the federal
seal of approval and placed judicial economy in the back seat.'
1. 470 U.S. 213 (1985)
2. Congress has afforded participants in transactions subject to its leg-
islative power an opportunity generally to secure prompt, economical and
adequate solution of controversies through arbitration if the parties are
willing to accept less certainty of legally correct adjustment. On the other
hand, it has enacted the Securities Act to protect the rights of investors and
has forbidden a waiver of any of those rights.
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953)
3. The Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have all adopted the intertwining
doctrine (see infra note 25 and accompanying text) while the Sixth, Seventh and
Eighth Circuits have all rejected the doctrine. (see infra note 26 and accompanying
text). The D.C. Circuit has rejected the doctrine when arbitrable state claims were
joined with nonarbitrable federal antitrust claims. Lee v. Ply*Gem, Inc., 593 F.2d
1266, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
4. This note will only deal with these federal securities statutes: Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970 & Supp. III. 1984) and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970 & Supp. V. 1975).
5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1949)
6. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
7. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1947).
8. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4223.
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THE CONFLICT
The Federal Arbitration Act declares that arbitration provisions in ex-
isting contracts "shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 In
1953, an exception to the Arbitration Act was made in the case of claims
asserted under federal securities laws. This exception arose in Wilko v. Swan0
because of a conflict between the Arbitration Act and the Securities Act of
1933, which was enacted to protect the rights of investors and forbade a
waiver of those rights." The agreement to arbitrate claims arising under the
Securities Act was held to be void 2 as a "stipulation waiving the right to
seek a judicial remedy". 3 Courts have since barred agreements that would
compel arbitration of federal securities law claims.
The problem occurs when a nonarbitrable federal securities law claim is
joined through pendent jurisdiction with an arbitrable state law claim. The
dispute typically arises when a dissatisfied investor files suit against his bro-
ker, drafting the complaint primarily in terms of federal securities law vio-
lations and adding state common law claims of fraud, 4 negligent
misrepresentation, 5 breach of fiduciary duty 6 or damages for emotional
distress.' 7 In doing so, the investor can seek punitive damages under the state
law claims while simultaneously avoiding the arbitration of those claims
provided for in the Customer Agreement.
The solution is simple when the claims are legally and factually sepa-
rable.' 8 The policy of neither statute, is endangered by severing the action
and compelling arbitration of arbitrable claims while litigating the nonar-
9. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
10. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
11. The language used in both the 1933 and 1934 Acts is equivalent: "Any
condition, stipulation or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any
provision of this chapter of of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of
an exchange required thereby shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (197).
12. 346 U.S. at 435. "[W]e think the right to select the judicial forum is the
kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived under § 14 of the Securities Act." Id.
13. Id. at 438.
14. E.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1021 (6th Cir.
1979); Greitzer v. United States Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 762, 762 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
15. E.g., Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 550 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal.
1982).
16. See, e.g., Mansbach V. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1021 (6th
Cir. 1979); Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Cal.
1974).
17. E.g., Greitzer v. United States Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. Cal.
1971).
18. See, e.g., Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21
(E.D. Cal. 1974). However, a close inspection of the case reveals that the same facts
were necessary to prove both the contract claim and the rule lOb-5 claim, although
the necessary legal elements differed.
[Vol. 1986
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bitrable claims. When the claims are so factually tied to one another that it
was impractical to separate them, the federal circuits are split as to the
resolution of the problem.
A. Proponents of the Doctrine of Intertwining
One view embraced the "doctrine of intertwining" which permits federal
courts to refuse to refer to arbitration arbitrable state claims when these
claims are factually inextricable from nonarbitrable federal securities law
claims.' 9 These advocates would endow the district courts with discretion as
to the severability of the claims, requiring courts to judge how inextricable
the claims must be to merit severance.2 0
Advocates of the intertwining doctrine assert two arguments in support
of their position. First, they assert that referring the claims to arbitration
would thwart the Arbitration Act's primary goal of speedy and efficient
decisionmaking. 21 Splitting the cause of action would waste time because the
resolution of the same facts would have to be determined in two different
proceedings-a waste of time, factfinding and money. Proponents of the
intertwining doctrine assert that the Court's decision in Wilko v. Swan was
an unanticipated determination that the protective intent of the federal se-
curities laws was to take priority over the economic advantages of arbitration.
They point out that the Arbitration Act did not anticipate the pleading of
arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims arising out of closely intertwined factual
questions.22 Therefore, it is reasoned, since a contrary federal interest was
found to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh the mandate of the Arbitra-
tion Act in the past, the interest of speedy and efficient resolution of claims
should likewise be sufficient.23
A typical case in support of this point is Cunningham v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. 24 arising under the familiar scenario of a suit by an investor
against a brokerage firm for violation of federal securities laws and pendent
state laws. The court found that all claims arose from the same series of
19. See Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023 (11th
Cir. 1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981); Cunningham
v. Dean Witter, Reynolds, 550 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
20. See Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023, 1026
(lth Cir. 1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 336 (5th Cir. 1981).
21. See Raiford v. Buslease, Inc., 745 F.2d 1419, 1422 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing
the reversed 9th Circuit decision Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, for support, "We
believe that severance is impractical if not impossible in this case."); Witt v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 602 F. Supp. 867, 870 (1985).
22. Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 550 F. Supp. 578, 583 (E.D. Cal.
1982).
23. Id. at 585; see also Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 336 (5th
Cir. 1981).
24. 550 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
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occurrences 25 and, in order to avoid duplicative proceedings, refused to order
arbitration of the common law claims. 26 In so holding, the court stated that
"the Congressional goal of avoiding litigation where arbitration would be
cheaper and faster would be disserved if the court were to bifurcate the
proceedings and compel arbitration of the pendent claims." '21
The second reason asserted to support the denial of a motion to compel
arbitration in the context of mixed claims is the protection of the courts'
exclusive jurisdiction over federal securities claims. 2 It is feared that the
factfinding accomplished in an arbitration proceeding may bind, through
collateral estoppel, the federal court in a subsequent litigation of the federal
securities claim. 29 In the alternative, if the court orders arbitration after the
federal proceedings, any application of expertise by the arbitrator is effec-
tively preempted because the technical issues would most likely be decided
at trial.30 Either way it is argued that bifurcated proceedings foreclose the
major decisionmaking in one forum and are thus an unsatisfactory solution
to the problem.
This argument was emphasized in Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.31
In Miley, an investor sued her broker for violation of federal securities laws
and the fiduciary duty owed under common law. The Fifth Circuit relied on
the "doctrine of intertwining", 3 2 and in denying an order to arbitrate, the
court stated:
A federal forum is charged with the sole responsibility and is correlatively
granted the sole right to decide the ultimate issues essential to a federal
securities claim, based on its own appraisal of the evidence. Allowing an
arbitrator to make the primary appraisal of the evidence and to reach the
primary conclusions on the issues central to the resolution of the case pre-
sents a threat of binding the federal forum through collateral estoppel...
and, at the very least, forces the federal court to reach its findings in the
light of prior conclusions by the arbitrators on the very same issues. 31
Although admitting that the exclusive federal jurisdiction would be preserved
by allowing the federal trial to proceed while arbitration of the state claim
was stayed, the court was unwilling to permit the pendent state claims to be
arbitrated in the case where the jury finds a violation of federal securities
laws. 34
25. Id. at 582.
26. Id. at 585.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Belke v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023,
1026 (11th Cir. 1982).
29. See, e.g., Miley, 637 F.2d at 335-36; Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d
540, 542 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
30. 550 F. Supp. at 585.
31. 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
32. Id. at 335.
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B. Proponents of Bifurcation
The opposing view supports the enforcement of an arbitration agreement
even though arbitration would result in bifurcated proceedings. This view
does not consider the efficiency of trying all related claims together sufficient
grounds for finding an otherwise valid contractual arbitration provision unen-
forceable.3" Proponents of bifurcation argue that the plain meaning of the
Arbitration Act as well as the strong federal policy favoring enforcement of
arbitration agreements requires that arbitrable claims be arbitrated pursuant
to the agreements between the parties.36 This faction asserts that the legislative
history of the Arbitration Act shows the intent of the drafters was not to
ensure speedy and efficient decisionmaking. Rather, it was to ensure judicial
enforcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate.17 The resulting bi-
furcation occurs because the Federal Securities Act requires piecemeal res-
olution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement.3 8
The proposition that bifurcated proceedings may allow an arbitration to
bind the federal court through collateral estoppel is defended on the ground
that, although there may be a preclusive effect, the federal court has discre-
tion to stay either proceeding pending resolution of the other to achieve a
just result.3 9 Where the securities claims predominate over arbitrable claims,
a stay of arbitration proceedings would prevent a collateral estoppel effect 0
Where arbitrable claims predominate the securities claims, a stay on the
securities litigation would allow the arbitrator proper leeway to resolve the
dispute according to the expertise required in solving the dominate technical
issues. 41
This reasoning was followed in Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc. 42
The broker in Dickinson appealed from a District Court order which denied
its motion for a stay of proceedings pending arbitration of state law claims
35. Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir.
1984) (citing C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan International Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1231-32 (7th
Cir. 1977)).
36. See Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981); Surman
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1984); Liskey v.
Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983).
37. Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, 661 F.2d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 1981).
38. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
39. Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, 661 F.2d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 1981) ([Tlhis
threat to the jurisdiction of the federal courts does not justify denying arbitration of
otherwise arbitrable intertwined state law claims.'"0; see also C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan
Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1231 (7th Cir. 1977).
40. Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 558 F.2d 831 (7th
Cir. 19770; Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100 (2nd Cir. 1970);
Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
41. Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 1976); Collins Radio
Co. v. Ex-Cell-O-Corp., 467 F.2d 995, 1000 (8th Cir. 1972): Fox v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 453 F. Supp. 561, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
42. Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981).
19861
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brought by its former client. 41 In reversing the order, the Seventh Circuit
court explained that "by controlling the order of the two adjudications...
the district court can preserve its full authority to decide the non-arbitrable
federal issues without any collateral estoppel consequences from a prior ar-
bitration.""
Other cases have followed the Dickinson rationale. The court in Liskey
v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.45 compared extensively the reasoning in Dick-
inson with that in Cunningham and concluded that "the Dickinson rule
strikes the proper balance between the competing policies in the Arbitration
Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." 46 The court in Surman v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith47 held that "state fraud claims were
subject to arbitration even though based on the same transaction as the
federal securities law claims. "48
Dickinson and its progeny49 indicate a step forward in the national policy
favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements, but the question as to what
preclusive effect an arbitration proceeding might have is left unresolved,50
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd notwithstanding.5
The basis of the problem is the rule of jurisdiction bringing these claims
together. A state law claim may be joined to a federal securities law claim
in federal court by pendent jurisdiction if both claims derive from " 'a
common nucleus of operative fact' and are such that the plaintiff 'would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.' "52 In order
to be within the district judge's jurisdiction, therefore, the state law claim
43. Id. at 641.
44. Id. at 644.
45. Liskey v. Oppenheimber & Co., 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983).
46. Id. at 320.
47. 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1984).
48. Id. at 63.
49. See also, Speck v. Oppenheimer & Co., 583 F. Supp. 325, 330 (W.D.
Mo. 1984).
50. Severance seems to be the rule rather than the exception. See, e.g., Stock-
well v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In Stockwell, common
law claims, including breach of fiduciary duty, were joined with federal securities law
claims. The court noted:
[R]elief sought in each of these counts is based on the same transactions
which are the subject of the Securities Exchange Act counts, which must be
determined by the court under the Wilko doctrine. There would appear to
be little purpose in having both the court proceeding and the arbitration
going on at the same time, and doubtless the ultimate determination by the
court of the [securities law claims] would have a definite bearing on the
outcome of the arbitration proceeding
Id. at 220. Nevertheless, the court did not refuse to allow the common law issues to
go to arbitration, but stayed arbitration pending the courts resolution of the securities
claims. Id.
51. 470 U.S. at 222.
52. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, 105 (4th Ed. 1983).
[Vo1..1986
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would necessarily be closely tied to the federal securities law claim, at least
factually." For this reason, opponents of the doctrine of intertwining call it
"the exception that swallowed the rule," '5 4 allowing the presence of a non-
arbitrable claim to force a trial on the otherwise arbitrable claim.
THE CASE
A. Lamar Byrd sold his dental practice in 1981 and invested the $160,000
proceeds through Gale, a Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (Dean Witter) em-
ployee. 55 In less than eight months the value of the account declined by more
than $100,000.6 Byrd filed a complaint against Dean Witter in district court,
alleging violations of federal securities law and various state law provisions,
which were joined through the principle of pendent jurisdiction. 57
Byrd signed a Customer Agreement containing an agreement to arbitrate
disputes arising out of the management of the account. 58 Accordingly, Dean
Witter filed a motion for an order severing the pendent state claims, com-
pelling their arbitration and staying arbitration of those claims pending res-
olution of the federal court action.5 9 The district court denied the motion to
sever and compel arbitration of the pendent state claims.6 On an inter-
locutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 6 Al-
though the Court of Appeals noted that district courts in the Ninth Circuit
were split on this issue, 62 it found the district court had discretion to determine
the similarity of factual issues. 6 The court reasoned that a separation of
claims would frustrate the purposes of the Arbitration Act and the protective
intent of the federal securities laws.64 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit 65 and settled this issue. Other questions, however, were left unan-
swered.
THE DECISION
The Supreme Court's decision continued the trend of giving a liberal
interpretation to the Arbitration Act and favoring the enforcement of arbi-
53. See generally United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
54. Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, 661 F.2d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 1981).
55. Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 726 F.2d 552, 553 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd,
470 U.S. 213 (1985).
56. Id.
57. 470 U.S. at 214.
58. Id. at 215.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 215-16.
61. 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
62. Id. at 554.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
1986]
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tration agreements. The Court's 1983 holding in Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.6 resulted in bifurcated proceedings
through enforcement of an arbitration agreement. 6' In Moses the Court af-
firmed the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' order which reversed a District
Court order to stay resolution of a district court proceeding pending reso-
lution of a state court suit. 6 Both suits involved the issue of the arbitrability
of a construction comany's claims for delay and impact costs because of the
Hospital's delay or inaction. The majority found substantial reason for doubt
that the construction company would be able to obtain from the state court
an order compelling the Hospital to arbitrate69 and since there were no ex-
ceptional circumstances, 70 the District Court's stay order was held unjusti-
fied. 7 The Court restated the rule that "any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.
7 2
The Court attacked the "doctrine of intertwining" on basically the same
premises as did the proponents of bifurcation and the Dickinson line of cases.
The Court rejected the contention that speedy and efficient resolution of
disputes was the primary purpose of the Arbitration Act. 73 It found instead
that the "preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce
private agreements into which parties had entered, 74 and that concern requires
that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is 'pie-
cemeal' litigation". 7 The Court found support for this proposition in the
House Report accompanying the Arbitration Act,'7 which states that the
purpose of the Act was to place arbitration agreements "upon the same
footing as other contracts, where it belongs." 77
The Court vaguely defended the proposition that arbitration would have
no collateral estoppel effect on subsequent litigation. 78 The Court first rea-
soned that there will not necessarily be a preclusive effect on subsequent
66. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
67. Id. at 22.
68. Id. at 29.
69. Id. at 26-27.
70. Id. at 19. The "exceptional circumstances" test was formulated in Col-
orado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1976).
This test incorporated a balancing approach to decide when a federal district court
may decline to exercise its jurisdiction because of parallel state court litigation. That
balancing test involved weighing four factors: which court first assume jurisdiction
over the property involved in the litigation, inconvenience of the federal forum,
avoidance of piecemeal litigation and the order in which the concurrent forums ob-
tained jurisdiction.
71. 460 U.S. 28.
72. 470 U.S. at 221 (quoting Moses, 460 U.S. at 24-25).
73. Id. at 219.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 221.
76. H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
77. Id.
78. 470 U.S. at 222.
[Vol. 1986
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litigation. 79 The recent McDonald v. City of West Branch1s decision was
offered in support of that contention. The Court held in McDonald that the
full faith and credit provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 does not permit a federal
court to accord a preclusive effect to an unappealed arbitration award because
arbitration is not a judicial proceeding and therefore the statute did not
apply.8 Since the Court found arbitration an inadequate substitute for a
judicial proceeding in protecting federal statutory and constitutional rights,
it refused to fashion a federal common law rule of preclusion.1
2
The Court explained that courts may effectively protect federal interests
by determining the preclusive effect to be given to an arbitration proceeding.83
Neither a stay of arbitration nor a refusal to compel arbitration of state
claims is required to prevent a preclusive effect as to subsequent federal
litigation. 84 The trial courts have broad discretion, as circumstances dictate,
to determine the weight to be accorded the prior arbitral decision.
If the Court later declares that arbitration proceedings will have preclu-
sive effect on subsequent litigation, federal court procedure would be dam-
aged. The rules of evidence are more relaxed in arbitration, and procedures
which are common in civil trials may be unavailable or limited. For these
reasons, there is a possibility that evidence would be admitted by the arbi-
trator which might otherwise be barred in federal court.
On the other hand, if the court gives no preclusive effect to arbitration
proceedings, the use of arbitration as an effective method of dispute reso-
lution may suffer. If parties realize that findings of fact may not be given
effect in a subsequent proceeding, whether in an appeal in federal court or
litigation of a pendent federal securities law claim, the finality of an arbi-
tration will always be in question. Rather than risk the time, money, and
effort, parties involved in establishing their case may abandon arbitration as
a method of settling disputes. In addition, the possibility of inconsistent
results in both proceedings may be seen as both unfair and a further weak-
ening of arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Company.85 An employee brought suit against his employer under Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 86 which requires equal employment opportun-
ities. The employee's claim under a nondiscrimination clause in a collective-
bargaining agreement was rejected in an arbitration proceeding.8 7 The district
79. Id.
80. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
81. Id. at 291-92.
82. Id. at 290.
83. 470 U.S. at 223.
84. Id.
85. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et. seq (1964).
87. 415 U.S. at 42.
1986]
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court dismissed the action, 8 claiming that the employee was bound by the
arbitral decision which precluded him from suing his employer under Title
VII.9 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed,90 and the Su-
preme Court reversed. 91
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, explained that, because Title
VII vested federal courts with plenary powers to enforce statutory require-
ments and provided for a private right of action to obtain judicial enforce-
ment of Title VII, an individual does not forfeit his private cause of action
if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under a collective bar-
gaining agreement. 92 The Court supported its holding with the following
reasoning:
In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate
his contractual right under a collective-bargaining agreement. By contrast,
in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts independent statutory
rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly separate nature of these con-
tractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated
as a result of the same factual occurrence. 91
The Court stressed that an arbitration decision binds both the employer and
the employee, and judicial review is limited to both. 94 However, in instituting
an action under Title VII, the employee does not seek judicial review of the
arbitral decision but, instead, asserts a statutory right independent of the
arbitration process. 95
The Court also rejected the argument that permitting a later resort to a
judicial forum would undermine the employer's incentive to arbitrate. 96 The
union's reciprocal promise not to strike, it was reasoned, is the primary
incentive for an employer to enter into an arbitration agreement, and that
incentive outweighs any costs resulting from according employees an arbitral
remedy in addition to their judicial remedy. 9
Alexander differs from Byrd in some important aspects. The claim in
Alexander was the same in both the federal court and arbitration proceedings,
while Byrd only urged that inextricably tied pendent state claims be adju-
dicated in an arbitration proceeding apart from the federal claims in federal
court. The statutes at issue in both cases also afford grounds for distinction.
Title VII, unlike the 1933 Act, does not limit enforcement of its provisions
88. 346 F. Supp. 1012 (1971).
89. Id. at 1019.
90. 466 F.2d 1209 (1972).
91. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
92. Id. at 49.
93. Id. at 49-50.
94. Id. at 54.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 55.
[Vol. 1986
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to the federal courts.98 Moreover, the question in Alexander was whether a
statutory right is foreclosed by prior submission of the claim to arbitration.
In Byrd, the question is not that direct. Proceeding on the assumption that
the claims are severed, the statutory claim in Byrd is itself in no danger of
being preempted, but some or all of the underlying facts necessary for res-
olution of the state claims may be determined in arbitration. The federal
court is thus restricted in its ability to freely rule on the evidence and on the
issues pursuant to the procedural parameters necessary to its proper func-
tioning.
Despite the differences, Alexander does offer some insight into the Court's
position regarding the preclusion issue in cases such as Byrd. The case reveals
the Court's attitude as one of deference to the federal courts when a sta-
tutorily protected right is in danger of foreclosure by a binding arbitration
decision. Alexander, in a sense, foreshadows the future, in that it expressly
recognizes arbitration as a "comparatively inappropriate forum'' 99 for the
final resolution of statutorily protected rights, especially those whose en-
forcement is limited to the federal courts. To that end, the Court explained
the relative differences between the forums and their processes, permitting
trial in both forums. The arbitral decision was allowed to be admitted as
evidence, giving the court discretion as to the weight to accord it.?°
At the present time, the question of what preclusive effect arbitration
proceedings might have has been left unanswered. The determination as to
what analysis would encompass this situation will have to wait for a future
case.
Another question left unresolved was whether the Wilko analysis should
apply in the context of a claim arising under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. The Court explained in a footnote'0' that Dean Witter did not seek to
compel arbitration of the federal securities claims in district court, and re-
fused to address the issue. Numerous lower courts have held that the Wilko
analysis applies to the 1934 Act. 10 2 In his concurring opinion, however, Justice
White emphasized that this issue was still an open question, and that these
98. Id. at 56.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 60.
101. 470 U.S. at 216 n.l.
102. See, e.g., Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 558 F.f
2d 831, 833-35 (7th Cir. 1977); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 n.3 (5th
Cir.. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3rd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
Apparently, Dean Witter relied on decisions such as these in assuming the 10(b)-5
claims was nonarbitrable. In light of the Court's dicta in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) and the concurring opinion in Byrd clarifying the Court's
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holdings should be viewed with suspicion, since the reasoning used in the
1933 Act is inapplicable to the 1934 Act. 03
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision to enforce arbitration agreements regardless of
resultant bifurcated proceedings is somewhat problematic. Bifurcation in the
majority of these cases will result in delay, duplication, and inconvenience-
the price to be paid for protection of parties' contractual rights to arbitration.
The preclusive effect of arbitration proceedings on subsequent litigation will
only be resolved when such a case squarely confronts the Court. Cases such
as Alexander, however, do give some indication of the Court's sympathies,
and a solution such as that found in Alexander may well be the direction
the Court takes. In the future, the Court may rule the Wilko exception limited
to the 1933 Act, which could alleviate the problem.
As it stands now, however, the problem will never be fully alleviated
without additional action by the Court further defining an integrated federal
policy concerning arbitration and securities rights, and reconciling the ap-
parently incompatible legal theories of bifurcation and pendent jurisdiction.
RANEE MELISSA FORCE
103. In arriving at its conclusion in Wilko, the Supreme Court relied on three
interconnected provisions in the 1933 Act. While section 14 of the 1933 Act is equiv-
alent to section 29 of the 1934 Act, the counterparts do not exist in the 1934 Act.
In the 1934 Act, jurisdiction is restricted to the federal coaurts and the cause of
action is only implied, therefore the phrase "waive compliance with any provision
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